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This study investigates the main causes and consequences of import and export smuggling 
and estimates the relative index of smuggling in Iran from 1970 to 2002. The Multiple 
Indicators - Multiple Causes (MIMIC) econometric modelling is used for a comprehensive 
analysis of the latent variable of smuggling. The main results of this paper indicate that the 
rate of fine for smuggling and the general level of education reduce smuggling, while the 
tariff burden increases the incentives for illegal trade. More trade openness accompanies more 
illegal trade for the case of Iran. On average, the relative size of smuggling is about 13% of 
the total trade in Iran. The absolute amount of smuggling per year is about $3 billion. 
JEL Code: O17, C39, H26. 





Mohammad Reza Farzanegan 
Dresden University of Technology 
Faculty of Business and Economics 








This version 14.08.08 
I wish to thank Mohammad Akhbari, Hadi.S. Esfahani, Annabel Payne, Marcel Thum, and 
participants in the Labsi International Conference on Political Economy (2007, Italy), 14th 
Annual Conference of ERF (2007, Egypt), and European Public Choice Conference (2008, 
Germany) and CESifo workshop on “Illicit Trade and Globalization” (2008, Italy) for their 
invaluable comments. The financial support of German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) 
and CESifo is highly appreciated. The remaining errors are mine. 2 
1. Introduction 
Smuggling can be defined as the clandestine import of goods from one jurisdiction to another (Deflem 
and Henry, 2001). Another definition says that smuggling is the evasion of excise taxes on goods by 
circumvention of border controls (Merriman, 2003). Regardless of different approaches to definitions 
of  this  complex  multi-aspect  issue,  the  effects  of  smuggling  are  numerous  and  economically 
significant. For instance, smuggling creates losses in public revenues, it affects the internal structure of 
a  society  by  creating  powerful  illegal  institutions,  and  it  changes  the  patterns  of  consumption 
(Dominguez, 1975).  Furthermore, it may have a negative effect on official indicators such as growth 
and income distribution.  
It  can  be argued  that  the  primary  forces of  supply  and  demand  drive  smuggling.  Whenever  state 
intervention drives a wedge between international and domestic prices (through excise duties, trade 
restrictions  and  custom  duties),  there  is  an  incentive  for  underground  activities.  Smuggling  is  an 
activity  that  is  used to  earn  income  from  carrying  goods through  the  state border in violation of 
existing rules. Smugglers seek to generate income by avoiding state control, regulations and related 
costs (Lithuanian Free Market Institute, 2004). It involves bribery and other forms of corruption and is 
of a criminal nature.  
While a large body of literature is devoted to theoretical aspects of the effects of smuggling on social 
welfare
2, this paper estimates the determinants and effects of smuggling in a natural resource abundant 
economy. Estimating smuggling is challenging because it is an illegal and hidden activity. A number 
of methods to estimate smuggling are available, but each method has its limitations. The methods 
usually applied to estimate smuggling can be classified through direct and indirect approaches. Direct 
methods  are  based  on  contacts  with  or  observations  of  persons  and/or  firms,  to  gather  direct 
information  about  smuggled  products.  We  can  categorize  the  indirect  methods  of  estimating 
smuggling as: (1) discrepancies between the sale of goods under study and the estimated consumption 
of those products by using household surveys; (2) discrepancies between the sale of goods and the 
estimated consumption of those products by using econometric estimation; (3) discrepancies between 
the trade figures of the target country with her trade partners in order to find “mis-invoicing”; and (4) 
the model approach or MIMIC (Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes) method. 
The principal technique of detecting illegal trade – the partner country data comparison technique – 
has its origins in the work of Morgenstern (1950) on the accuracy of foreign trade statistics. The 
technique was further developed by Bhagwati (1964) and Naya and Morgan (1969). Bhagwati (1964) 
compared the import data of Turkey from the other countries with the recorded figures of export from 
trade partners of Turkey. He found under-invoicing in Turkey’s official imports. Naya and Morgan 
(1969) followed a similar methodology for the case of South East Asian countries. They observed 
                                                
2 For example, Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1973), Martin and Panagariya (1984), 
Norton (1988), and Thursby and Thursby (1991), to name a few.  
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irregular patterns in this region’s trade, suggesting a large degree of inaccuracy and discrepancy in 
trade data. 
Alano (1984) carried out an econometric analysis of import smuggling in the Philippines during 1965-
1978. The dependent variable in his study is import smuggling that was calculated based on partner-
country  trade  data  discrepancies.  This  information  was  generated  by  comparing  export  figures  of 
major trade partners of the Philippines with import figures of this country from them. His estimation 
of smuggling for the Philippines ranged from 28.95% to 53.81% of the reported exports to this country 
from the partner countries. His results support the dominant role of technical smuggling through legal 
trade channels hypothesis  in the case of the Philippines. Phylaktis (1991) developed a stock-flow 
model on the base of Dornbusch et al. (1983) model and error correction model (ECM) to explain the 
determinants of black market premium in Chile. Among the important determinants of black market 
premium,  she  emphasized  on  the  role  of  import  smuggling.  According  to  her  words  “tariffs  by 
encouraging import smuggling, tend to increase the black market premium, which in turn motivates 
exporters to direct export earnings to the black market”.  
Yavari (2000) followed the methodology of Bhagwati (1964) and estimated over-valuation of imports 
in Iran for the period of 1977-1997. His calculation of import mis-invoicing shows a different pattern 
before and after the final year of war with Iraq (1988). While, before this year, we can observe both 
under-invoicing and over-invoicing of imports, the most years after 1988 demonstrate the dominant 
share of over-invoicing of imports. By using import tariff as a proxy for smuggling in a panel data for 
70 developing countries from 1956 to 1998, Oskooee and Goswami (2003) demonstrated the positive 
effect of smuggling on the black market premium.  Madah and Pajoyan (2005) examined smuggling in 
Iran through structural equation approach. They calculated an ordinal trend of import smuggling by 
using three causal variables, namely rate of fine, ratio of official to black exchange rate and import 
tariff. They obtained the negative effect of fine rate and positive effect of the last two casuals on 
smuggling. However, the authors did not estimate the relative size of smuggling and absolute figure of 
it throughout the period. This step needs further estimation of (import and export) smuggling with 
another methodology such as trade discrepancy to transform the ordinal index to relative index of 
smuggling. They also failed to control for standard variables like GDP per head, trade openness and 
human  capital.  In  addition,  their  study  is  focusing  on  import  smuggling,  ignoring  the  export 
smuggling. Finally, although the authors admit that the causal variables are not stationary but they 
estimated the ordinal index with the level of variables. This requires the existence of cointegration 
among indicator and casual variables, which is not provided by them.   
Our contribution is estimate of import and export smuggling size (relative and absolute) in total trade 
of Iran by including more standard variables which may affect smuggling, controlling for exogenous 
shocks of revolution (1979), war with Iraq (1980-1988), the major revision of smuggling punishment 
regulation in 1993/94 and unification of exchange rates (2002). Meanwhile, we estimate mis-invoicing 
(under  and over invoicing  of  both  exports and  imports) in  Iran  to  transform the  ordinal index of 4 
smuggling in Iran.  In addition, we examine specific effects of smuggling on  the real government 
revenue, real tax revenues, real import price index and growth rate of gasoline consumption. The 
analysis uses the annual data for the case of Iran over the period of 1970-2002.  
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, stylized facts of the Iranian economy that make it an 
interesting  case  for  study  smuggling  is  presented.  Section  3  reviews  the  theoretical  literature  on 
smuggling. The empirical methodology is presented in section 4. The empirical model and explaining 
the variables are presented in section 5. Finally, empirical results and main conclusions are presented 
in sections 6 and 7, respectively.  
 
2. Stylized facts on Iran 
2.1. Rules and regulations for smuggling in Iran 
 
The illegal transaction happens in order to avoid legal taxation and duties for those goods which can 
be imported legally. However, there is also an incentive for smuggling those goods that are prohibited 
based on legal or religious grounds such as alcoholic beverages and drugs in the case of Iran. The 
main relevant rules and regulations in Iran about smuggling are “Penal codes on smuggling” (1933), 
“Custom  rule”  (1971),  and  “Governmental  discretionary  punishments  rule”  (1994).  The  1933 
punishment rule for smuggling identified different kinds of smuggling. This classification covers the 
following groups: (1) the smuggling of legal products; (2) the import smuggling of illegal products; 
(3) the export smuggling of illegal products; (4) the smuggling of monopoly products; and (5) special 
activities.  
 
 The smuggling of legal products is the import or export of those products for which the government 
accounts for custom duties and taxes at the time of the preparation of annual budgets. In fact, these 
products can be traded legally through payment of official duties and taxes. Smugglers evade legal 
import taxes and custom duties in this case. Legal products may also be categorized into two groups. 
First are those goods which do not need the permission of relevant governmental organizations for 
importing or exporting. These groups of goods will be determined by the Ministry of Commerce in 
annual import and export regulations at the beginning of each year. After the approval of the Council 
of Ministers, the list of these goods will be announced to national customs. Second are conditional 
legal products. These are legal products, which because of a special situation in the domestic economy 
and  general  socio-political  policies,  need  prior  permissions  by  governmental  organizations.  For 
example, the import of special machinery products or medicines may require permission from the 
Ministry of Industry and Mines and Ministry of Health, respectively. The second and third groups are 
the import and export of illegal products. Custom rule has determined these products. Some examples 
of imported illegal goods are military weapons, drugs and anti-religious or materials printed which are 
opposed to social norms (books, magazines and  so  on).  In custom rule, we  can hardly find any 5 
concrete example of export smuggling of illegal goods.  In general, export smuggling of illegal goods 
refers to the export of those products that are prohibited based on religious or governmental rules. The 
fourth category is the smuggling of monopoly products. Monopoly products are those goods which 
based on monopoly regulations (such as the monopoly of tobacco rule, 1931) can be traded only by the 
government. Thus, trading such products without having the legal representation of the government is 
referred to as trading smuggled goods. Finally, the last category are some special activities which are 
not smuggling in theory but based on the perspective of the authorities will be treated as smuggling in 
practice. For example, Article 48 of Jungles Protection and Maintenance rule of 1985 declares that 
“transport  of  woods  and  gained  coals  from  trees  out  of  cities  without  licence  from  the  Forestry 
Organization will be punished like a smuggling act”. Another example is Article 1 of “Penal codes of 
sellers of anti-religious or anti-public decency textiles”. The economic agents who import, produce, or 
sell such textiles are offenders and these textiles are treated as smuggled goods.  
 
2.2. Punishment codes for smuggling 
 
The  main  regulatory  development  to  combat  the  smuggling  of  goods  and  foreign  exchange  was 
realized through the governmental discretionary punishments of 1994 and its executives’ guidelines in 
2000. Based on this regulation, the penalty for smuggled goods depends on the value of goods and 
these fall into two groups: (1) products with the value of equal to or less than 10 million rials
3, and (2) 
products with a value beyond 10 million rials.  
 
2.2.1.  Products with the value equal to or less than 10 million rials 
 
Upon the detection of this group of products by the relevant governmental bodies (customs or police), 
they can seize the goods and inform the government revenues recipients’ offices. In this case, related 
official bodies without extra monetary penalties will seize the detected consignment. Based on articles 
12 and 20 of executives’ guidelines of governmental discretionary punishments, the governmental 




2.2.2.   Products with a value of over 10 million rials 
In  this  case,  according  to  the  governmental  discretionary  punishments  rule  (approved  in  1994) 
governmental revenues recipients' offices, besides seizing the smuggled consignment, will also receive 
                                                
3 For more information on the value of the rial see : http://cbi.ir/exrates/rates_en.aspx 
4 This organization is affiliated with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and founded in 1991 as a governmental 
company. The headquarters of this company  are in  Tehran.  The  main functions  of this company are the 
gathering,  managing  and selling  of  abandoned  governmental  and  non-governmental  as  well  as confirmed 
smuggled products. 6 
the cash penalty. The cash penalty is twice the value of smuggled products. In this case, the offender 
may accept or reject to pay the fines. In the former case, upon payment of the penalty, the offender 
will receive an official fine receipt and will be free of any other judicial prosecution. In the latter case, 
the case will be sent to court within 5 days upon detection. In the case of confirmation of a smuggling 
offence, the offender will be sentenced to imprisonment besides seizing the smuggled products or 
foreign exchange. Furthermore, they must pay the amount of monetary penalty, which will not be 
lower than twice the value of smuggled products.  
 
2.3. The main contributing factors to smuggling in Iran 
 
Tariffs and non-tariffs barriers, strict controls of foreign exchange transactions, pervasive corruption, 
and high price disparity among Iran and her neighbours because of considerable subsidies on fuel 
products are recognized as the main reasons behind the smuggling in Iran. A study by Doing Business 
(2008) has examined the comparative situation of Iran in a term of international trade. Among 178 
economies, the ranking of Iran is 135, while UAE, Saudi Arabia and Jordan perform much better and 
have a ranking of 24, 33, and 59, respectively. Regarding comparative statistics of import cost (USD 
per 20 - foot container) in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa), only Iraq performs worse than 
Iran. While the best practice economy is Singapore with the cost of 367 USD per importing container, 
Iran has the cost of 1330 USD for the same container. These costs cover documents and administrative 
fees  for  customs  clearance  and  technical  control,  terminal  handling  charges  and  inland  transport 
excluding tariffs or trade taxes. The required time for the import of products into Iran is 42 days, while 
in the best practice economy, Singapore, the process lasts for only 3 days. Export process in Iran has 
the same properties. Table 1 shows the comparative international trade costs of Iran.  
Besides tariffs and non-tariffs burden on imports of legal products, foreign exchange market in Iran is 
the other main factor, which affects the incentives for illegal trade. The foreign exchange premium 
experienced unique records during the 1980s and 1990s in Iran. For example, the difference between 
the price of USD in rials in the black and official market reached a figure of 2170 percent in 1992. 
Biswas and Marjit (2007) have explained theoretically the interconnection between the black market 
premium and mis-invoicing of foreign trade. In such an environment, the exporters have incentives to 
under-invoice their real amount of exports to sell the unreported exports in the black market for higher 
profit. In fact, the export smugglers are suppliers of foreign exchange in the black market. The other 
important  supply  channels  in  the  black  market  are  through  over-invoicing  imports,  exchange  by 
foreign  tourists,  or  diversion  of  remittance  via  unofficial  channels,  and  diversion  by  government 
officials in exchange for bribes. In Iran however, during the high black market premium years, the 
government was also another main player.  The government as a sole receiver of petro-dollars covered 
some part of the budget deficits through selling the dollars in the black market instead of in the official 
market under the title of “other revenues” in the annual budgets. 7 





















Best practice economies 
Canada  3           
China      390       
Denmark    5    3     
Singapore          3  367 
 
Iran  8  26  860  10  42  1330 
Comparative economies 
Jordan  7  19  680  7  22  1056 
Oman  10  22  665  10  26  824 
UAE  7  13  462  8  13  462 
Source: Doing Business in Iran, 2008. 
The share of “other revenues” in the annual budgets increased from an average of 14% between 1978-
1988 (revolution and war period) to 36.2% during 1989-1992 (Valadkhani, 2004). When we want to 
examine the mis-invoicing of exports and imports in Iran, we should also pay attention to the relative 
size of the premium to non-oil export bonus and tariff burden. If the premium in the black market 
outweighs the export bonus, then there is an incentive for the under-invoicing of exports. Meanwhile, 
when the premium outweighs the tariff rate, there would be an incentive for import over-invoicing. Of 
course, the exact effect of the premium in the black market on the illegal imports is not clear. On the 
one hand, we may expect that those importers who have access to the official banking system for 
opening an L/C (Letter of credit) try to misprice their real imports through over invoicing. This may 
enable them to acquire more subsidized exchange, some part of which will be sold in the black market 
of  foreign  exchange.  On  the  other  hand,  for  those  illegal  importers  who  do  not  have  access  to 
subsidized exchange, the increasing premium means an increasing financing cost of illegal import. In 
the latter case, an increasing premium will not be an incentive for mis-invoicing, but an extra cost 
burden on import smugglers. Figure 1 shows the trend of premium in the black market of US dollar for 




























Figure 1: Black Market Premium (percentage) 
Source: Central Bank of Iran (2008) 
Since  the  unification  of  the  exchange  rate  in  2002,  the  black  market  premium  has  reduced 
substantially. Now the main motivation for import and export smuggling in Iran is the high tariff 
burden  for  protecting  the  domestic  industries  and  producers,  a  continuation  of  subsidies  on  fuel 
products  in  Iran  and  export  bonus  for  non-oil  exporters.  For  example,  the  detected  export  mis-
invoicing in Khoramshahr Custom (South-west of Iran in Khouzestan province) over the two years of 
2006 and 2007 is 1.2 billion USD. Another example in the mentioned custom is related to an exporter 
who reported 10 million USD exports and benefited from export bonuses; however, it was cleared 
after investigation that he has not exported any amount of materials, mis-invoicing the 10 million USD 
through a corrupt deal with custom officers.
5  
Another important factor for expanding the smuggling out of Iran is a large price disparity between 
Iran and her neighbours because of subsidies on fuel products. Around 90% of export smuggling in 
Iran belongs to oil related products. Table 2 shows the main import and export smuggled goods in Iran 





                                                
5 www.rajanews.com/News/?27704 (Persian News Agency, access: 2 June 2008) 9 
Table 2: The 10 Largest Detected Illegally Imported-Exported Goods (2005) 




Export smuggling  Share of total detected 
export smuggled goods 
(%) 
1  Machinery  24  Gas oil  60.6 
2  Car  12  Kerosene  17.6 
3  Alcoholic 
beverages 
9  Other petroleum 
products 
11 
4  Piece (cloths)  8.5  Gasoline  2.5 
5  Chemical 
materials 
8  Gold bar and clutch  1.5 
6  Accessory  4.7  Other goods  1.2 
7  Clothing  3.7  Car  1.1 
8  Gold bar and 
clutch 
3.1  Sugar  0.8 
9  Tea  3.1  Iron and clutch  0.5 
10  Cereals  3  Other machineries  0.5 
Total  79.1    97.3 
Source: Online portal of “Combating Goods and Exchange Smuggling Central Staff” 
Subsidies on fuel products in 2003 were 10.6 % of GDP, while the share of subsidies on essential 
goods in this year was 13.7% (Komijani, 2004). The subsidies on fuel products in 2003 were twice the 
amount  of  tax  revenues  and  almost  equalled  oil  revenues  (Komijani,  2004).  The  price  disparity, 
following these huge subsidies provides an attractive opportunity for smuggling. Table 3 shows the 











Price in Iran 
(rial per litre) 
FOB price 
(rial per litre) 
Subsidy 
(Billion rial) 
1995  11.1  100  529.4  4791 
1996  12  130  664.5  6426 
1997  12.7  160  707.7  6986 
1998  13.69  200  705.1  6916 
1999  14.2  350  1168.8  11698 
2000  15.5  385  1768  21513 
2001  16.7  450  1465.5  16976 
2002  18.3  500  1756  23061 
2003  20.1  650  2400  35175 
Source: Shirkavand (2004). 
Another challenging issue in combating smuggling and corruption in Iran is the inefficient monitoring 
system and weak enforcement of law. The role of some para-statal organizations and military bodies in 
smuggling also complicates this issue in Iran. For example, there was a high level of smuggling in the 
case of the Payam international airport, North West of Tehran, which is state-owned and operated by 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In 2005, an Iranian newspaper disclosed that “two 
thousand  tons  of  goods,  mainly  cosmetics,  performance  enhancing  medication,  and  computer 
electronics”  entered  Iran  on  cargo  carrier  Payam  Air,  a  company  owned  by  the  transportation 
ministry.
6 It is reported that four smuggling flights each day and as many as twice that number on 
holiday flights were in operation at this airport (Samii, 2005).  
Invisible jetties are also another well-known example of involvement of the IRGC in smuggling. An 
ex-parliamentarian  estimated that the  IRGC smuggling  might amount to  $12  billion  per  year. He 
remarked that “this smuggling business is of such magnitude that it cannot be done through donkeys or 
passengers”, and added that “this volume is entering the country through containers and via illegal and 
unofficial channels such as invisible jetties supervised by strong men and men of wealth”.
7  
                                                
6 “The Parliament Investigates the Payam Airport Case”, Iran Daily (Tehran), January 9, 2005, and “Payam 
Airport Not Implicated in Illegal Goods Transportation”, Shargh (now no longer in circulation), November 2, 
2004. 
7 For more details on the role of IRGC in the Iranian economy see: 
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26991/pub_detail.asp (access: 2 June 2008). Recently, a member of 
Iran's Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission, disclosed information about the role of high ranking officials 
of Iran in corruption and smuggling cases: 
http://www.roozonline.com/english/archives/2008/06/unprecedented_revelations_agai.html  (Access 10 June 
2008) 
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3.  Review of the theoretical literature 
In the past, economists have drawn our attention to the welfare aspects of smuggling. Bhagwati and 
Hansen (1973) studied the welfare levels under tariffs with and without smuggling. They assumed that 
smuggling involves a cost difference compared to legal trade. They model the extra cost of smuggling 
as a real resource cost. In their approach, constant fraction of the smuggled goods is lost. We cannot 
observe both illegal and legal trade simultaneously in their model. If the real unit cost of smuggling is 
too high, then we only observe official trade or official trade will substitute by illegal trade in the 
opposite situation. They concluded that the achievement of a given degree of protection to domestic 
importable  production,  in  the  presence  of  smuggling,  leads  to  lower  levels  of  welfare  than  if 
smuggling were absent.  This is due to real resource cost of smuggling, which absorbs the productive 
agents from official trade sector.  
Pitt (1981) proposed a model of smuggling consistent with the coexistence of smuggling, legal trade 
and price disparity. In his model, we can observe both legal and illegal trade simultaneously. He 
assumes that legal trade provides a cover for smuggling. The greater the legal trade, the easier it is to 
hide smuggling from enforcement agencies and smuggling would be less costly. In fact, the declared 
amounts of imported goods are sold at the loss on the local market, which is compensated by the 
profits of undeclared imported goods.  Furthermore, he discusses that the quantity of legal trade and 
tax revenues in the smuggling situation exceed that of the non-smuggling situation. He concluded that 
the policy of complete and effective enforcement against smuggling might not maximise the level of 
legal trade. The empirical question, which may arise from Pitt’s theoretical debate, is whether more 
openness in foreign trade section may also stimulate illegal trade.  
Martin  and  Panagariya  (1984)  showed  that  smuggling,  legal  trade  and  price  disparity  exist 
simultaneously. They modelled the economy response to increased enforcement of anti-smuggling 
laws. They showed that higher enforcement of law raises real per unit costs of smuggling and the 
domestic price of imports but lowers the absolute quantity and the share of illegal imports in total 
imports. However, their model does not illustrate an unambiguous effect of smuggling on the welfare. 
One of their major contributions is entering the real costs of smuggling as a choice variable of the firm 
in their model. These costs have an endogenous nature in their model. One of the empirical messages 
of their model is examining the effect of enforcement of law on the costs of smuggling and the price of 
importable goods.  
Norton (1988) provided a theoretical model for smuggling of agricultural goods within EEC countries, 
by  focusing  his  empirical  test  on  the  Republic  of  Ireland  and  Northern  Ireland.  He  entered  the 
transport cost for smuggling as well as the probability of detection into his model. He shows that an 
increase in the tax rate will increase the optimal choice of smuggled goods and the number of firms 
that are involved in this operation. As tax rates increase, intra-marginal smugglers will increase their 
expected rents from smuggling and the distance-margin for worthwhile smuggling will be extended. 12 
However, still some firms will not smuggle goods because of transport costs. His model also indicates 
that increasing the rate of fine in the case of detection will reduce the expected value of smugglers 
profits. The Norton model shows a negative relationship between the rate of fine on smuggling and the 
amount of smuggled goods on one side, and positive links between increased taxes and tariffs on legal 
imports and the amount of smuggled products on the other side. 
Thursby et al. (1991), proposed a model where smuggling is camouflaged by legal sales. This is in line 
with Pitt (1981) argument. They want to evaluate the effects of market structure and enforcement of 
law on smuggling and welfare. According to their model, cover effect in which official trade provides 
a cover for smugglers reduces the market price of imported goods. If these prices effects outweigh the 
extra real costs of smuggling, then smuggling will be pro-welfare. In this latter scenario, increasing 
enforcement of law may reduce the welfare. Similar to the Pitt model, their model may explain the 
increase of illegal trade alongside the legal one and more openness in foreign trade. Specifically this 
may happen when openness in foreign trade is not accompanied by necessary transparency in the 
foreign trade operational process.    
 
4. Empirical Methodology  
In  this  study,  a  specific  form  of  structural  equation  modelling  (e.g.  Multiple  Indicators  Multiple 
Causes)  is  used.  MIMIC  estimates  the  relationship  between  observable  variables  and  the  latent 
variable by minimizing the distance between the sample covariance matrix  S  and the covariance 
matrix  ) (θ Σ  predicted by the model. Formally, the MIMIC model consists of two parts: the structural 
equation model and the measurement model. The structural equation model is given by: 
,    + ′ = ς η x γ                                                                                                                                            (1)                   
Where  ) , , , ( = ′ 2 1 q x x x … x  is a  ) × 1 ( q  vector and each  q i , xi , , 1 =     …  is a potential cause of the latent 
variable  η (smuggling).  ) , , , ( = ′ 2 1 q γ γ γ … γ  is a  ) × 1 ( q  vector of coefficients in the structural model 
describing the “causal” relationships between the smuggling and its causes. Thus, the latent variable η 
is  linearly  determined  by  a  set  of  exogenous  causes.  Since  they  only  partially  explain  the  latent 
variable  η, the error term ς  represents the unexplained component. The MIMIC model assumes that 
the variables are measured as deviations from their mean and that the error term does not correlate to 
the causes, i.e.  0 = ) ( = ) ( = ) ( ς η E x E E  and  0 = ) ′ ( = ) ′ ( x E x E ς ς . The variance of ς  is abbreviated by 
ψ  and Φ  is the  ) × ( q q  covariance matrix of the causal variables. The measurement model represents 
the link between the latent variable (smuggling) and its indicators; i.e. smuggling is expressed in terms 
of observable variables. It is specified by: 
   ,    + = ε η λ y                                                                                                                       (2) 
Where  ) , , , ( = ′ 2 1 p y y y … y  is a  ) × 1 ( p  vector of indicator variables p j y j , , 1 =   ,   … .  ) , , ,   ( = ′ 2 1 p ε ε ε … ε  
is a  ) × 1 ( p   vector of disturbances  where  every  p j ε j , , 1 =   ,   …   is a  white  noise  error  term.  Their 13 
) × ( p p   covariance  matrix  is  given  by  ε Θ .  The  single  p j λj , , 1 =   ,   …   in  the  ) 1 × (p   vector  of 
regression coefficients  λ  represents the magnitude of the expected change of the respective indicator 
for a unit change in the latent variable. Like the MIMIC model’s causes, the indicators are directly 
measurable  and  expressed  as  deviations  from  their  mean,  i.e.  0 = ) ( = ) ( ε E y E .  Moreover,  it  is 
assumed that the error terms in the measurement model do not correlate either to the causes x or to the 
latent variableη, hence  0 = ) ′ ( = ) ′ ( x ε E ε x E  and  0 = ) ′ ( = ) ′ ( η η ε E ε E . A final assumption is that the 
s ´ ε  do not correlate to  ζ , i.e.  0 = ) ′ ( = ) ′ ( ε E ε E ς ς .  The model can be resolved as a function of the 
observed variables by substituting equation 1 into 2: 
z   +   Π = x y                                                                                                                                         (3) 
Where  the  endogenous  variables  p j y j , , 1 =   ,   …   are  the  latent  variable  η’s  indicators  and  the 
exogenous  variables  q i xi , , 1 =   ,   …   are  its  causes.  γ λ Π ′ =   is  a  matrix  with  rank  equal  1  and 
ε λ z + = ζ . The error term  z  in equation (3) is a  ) 1 × (p  vector of linear combinations of the white 
noise error terms  ς  and  ε from the structural equation and the measurement model, i.e.  ) ( ~ Ω 0, z .  
The  covariance  matrix  Ω   is  given  as  ε Θ λ λ ε λ ε λ E z Cov + ′ = ] )′ + )( + [( = ψ ς ς ) (   being  similarly 
constrained like  Π . Therefore the estimation of the model requires the normalization of one of the 
elements of the vector  λ  to an a priori value (Bollen, 1989).The model's covariance matrix extracted 
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This matrix describes the relationship between the observed variables in terms of their covariances. 
Since the latent variable is not observable, its size is unknown, and the parameters of the model must 
be estimated using the links between the observed variables’ variances and covariances. Thus, the goal 
of  the  estimation  procedure  is  to find  values  for  the  parameters  and  covariances  that  produce  an 
estimate for  ) (θ Σ ,  ) ˆ ( = ˆ θ Σ Σ , that is as close as possible to the sample covariance matrix  S  for the 
observed causes and indicators, i.e. the x s and ys. The estimation procedure deriving the parameters 
minimizes the following fitting function: 
( ) ( ) [ ] .   ) + ( - ln - ˆ + ln =
- q p tr F S θ SΣ θ Σ
1                                                                                                (5) 
                                                         
The first step in the MIMIC model estimation is to confirm the hypothesized relationships between the 
latent variable and its causes and indicators. Once we have identified and estimated these relationships 
and the parameters, the MIMIC model results can be used to calculate the latent variable scores. Next, 
with the help of the exogenous calculation of the relative size of smuggling in trade with the trade 
discrepancy approach, the ordinal scores of smuggling transform to cardinal scores and finally we 14 
estimate the  absolute amount of smuggling. Figure 2 illustrates the hypothesized path diagram of 
general MIMIC model.  
 
Figure 2: Hypothesized Path Diagram 
 
5. Model Variables 
5.1.   Causes (or determinants) of smuggling 
5.1.1  Black Foreign Exchange Market Premium (BMP) 
Macedo (1987) constructed a detailed model of the relationship between trade taxes, smuggling and 
black  markets  in  foreign  exchange.  The  behaviour  of  importers  and  exporters,  and  their  choice 
between legal trade and smuggling is the basis of this analysis. Smuggled imports are paid for with 
black market foreign exchange obtained from undetected smuggled exports. Since smuggled imports 
must be paid for with the black market foreign exchange, importers’ choices between smuggling and 
legal trade depend not only on the level of the import tariff and the probability of detection, but also on 
the black market premium. In fact, for the import smuggler, the black market exchange rate is a part of 
his illegal financing costs. Increasing premiums for this kind of smuggling means increasing costs of 
operation and a reduction in import smuggling will be expected. Barnett (2003) is endorsed the above 
argument  in  a  model  which  agents  decides  to  become  smuggler  or  entrepreneur  on  the  base  of 
premium in black market of foreign exchange. The idea behind his model is that for low amount of 
premium, it is cheap for agents to acquire foreign exchange in the parallel market. However, these 
models assume that illegal traders do not access to subsidized official exchange rate through banking 
system. According to Pitt (1981), legal trades are usually are cover for illegal trades. Therefore, in the 
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foreign exchange to finance  their  imports. In the latter case,  existence of high  premium  in  black 
market  encourages  traders  to  over-invoice  their  imports,  selling  the  extra  and  illegal  acquired 
subsidized exchange in the black market. In this case, we may expect to consider the positive effect of 
BMP on the import smuggling.  
While illegal importers are one of main demanders in the black market of foreign exchange, the flow 
supply of foreign exchange into this market is generated partly by illegal exporters through under-
invoicing of their exports. Thus, the amount of export smuggling will increase as the export tax rate 
and BMP increase. Therefore, we expect a positive effect of this variable on export smuggling.  In 
summary, two kinds of evidence suggest a strong link between illegal trade and the black premium.  
Firstly, trade data comparisons find that increases in the premium generate greater under-invoicing of 
exports  and  over-invoicing  of  the  imports  (McDonald,  1985).  Secondly,  studies  based  on  export 
supply functions find that a rise in the black premium tends to reduce exports as domestic companies 
resort to mis-invoicing or smuggling (Kiguel and O`Connel, 1995). The large amount of premium was 
one of the critical economic channelling over the post-revolution period. Between 1979 and 1989, the 
premium was rising at an average annual rate of 42.1% (Pesaran, 1992). In 1992, the black market rate 
for the dollar reached its peak 22 times the official rate (Central Bank of Iran, 2008). This unusually 
great premium achieved under strict control of foreign exchange in most years after the revolution. 
High premium provided a unique opportunity for rent-seeking activities and illegal trade. An importer 
with access to subsidized official exchange rate 22 times blow the black market has a great incentive 
for over invoicing of imports or under invoicing of exports for easy and immediate profit. After a long 
period  of  wasting  the  economic  resources  due  to  multiple  exchange  rates  and  highly  overvalued 
official  exchange  rate,  the  government  unified  the  exchange  rates  and  depreciated  the  official 
exchange in 2002. This institutional decision removed the black market premium largely.   We define 
the premium as a percentage difference between the black market of exchange rate for US dollar and 
the official exchange rate. The source of official and black exchange rates is the central bank of Iran.  
 
5.1.2  Penalty on Smuggling  
In the literature, the most popular determinants of smuggling are the rate of fine, punishment and 
enforcement of law (Martin et al., 1983 and Norton, 1988). In this study, the rate of fine on smuggling 
equals the Iranian rial amount of every US dollar smuggled goods adjusted for inflation.  The real rate 
of fine before revision of smuggling punishment codes by the Expediency Council of Iran in 1994 was 
very low and negligible. The real rate of penalty in 1994 increased by 46 times compared with its 
pervious year. The common hypothesis is that an increase in the rate of fine increases transaction costs 
of  the  smuggling  and  reduces  the  expected  profit.  Therefore,  a  negative  sign  for  the  parameter 
associated  with  this  variable  is  expected.    The  average  growth  rate  of  penalty  rate  for  the  pre-
revolution period (1970-79), the Iraq-Iran war period (1980-1988), and the post-war period (1989-
2002) is -15.3, -3.06, and 331 percent, respectively. The source of penalty data is Madah and Pajoyan 
(2005).   16 
 
5.1.3.  Tariff Burden 
Faced with high trade taxes or restrictions, traders often resort to illegal ways of conducting trade, 
such as smuggling and mis-invoicing of exports and imports. There is a large body of theoretical and 
empirical  literature  showing  that  taxes  and  restrictions  lead  to  under-invoicing,  smuggling,  rent-
seeking  and  other  forms  of  directly  unproductive  activities.8  Phylaktis  (1992)  demonstrated  the 
positive  effects  of  this  variable  on  individuals’  incentives  for  smuggling  in  Chile.  Oskoee  and 
Goswami (2003) also used the tariff rate as a proxy of smuggling in their panel data study for 70 
developing countries. Furthermore, these trade restrictions cause price disparity among domestic and 
international markets and those mark-ups on imported goods provide an incentive for illegal imports 
and tariff evasion (Pitt, 1981). Whenever a country imposes such restrictions, domestic prices differ 
from the world market price, which may provide an incentive for smuggling. We define tariff burden 
as the ratio of real import tax on real imports. The average of tariff burden for the pre-revolution 
period (1970-79), the Iraq-Iran war period (1980-1988), and the post-war period (1989-2006) is 14, 
11, and 8 percent, respectively. The average share of import tax in total tax revenues over similar time 
intervals are 39, 31, and 27 percent (Central Bank of Iran, 2008). This declining trend of tariff burden 
is expected to channelize some part of illegal trade to legal one. The source of this data is the central 
bank of Iran.  
 
5.1.4.  GDP per capita 
We might expect that as a country becomes richer, she might purchase or invest in the institutions and 
agencies needed to provide the information to better monitor the officials, for example in foreign trade 
sector (Rosendorff and Doces, 2006). Thus, we expect a negative effect on smuggling. However, we 
also expect that increasing income per capita increases the effective demand for both legal and illegal 
imports. In the latter case, the income effect of an increasing GDP may cause growth in the market of 
illegal imports, too. Meanwhile, Braun and Di Tella, 2004 and Frechette, 2006 support the positive 
effects of increasing income on corruption related activities. Braun and Di Tella (p. 3) explain that this 
is due to the pro-cyclical nature of corruption related activities, where “moral standards are lowered 
during booms, as greed becomes the dominant force for economic decision”. The average of real GDP 
per capita growth for the pre-revolution period (1970-79), the Iraq-Iran war period (1980-1988), and 
the post-war period (1989-2005) is 5, -5.01, and 3.42 percent, respectively. The source of this data is 
the central bank of Iran data.  
 
5.1.5.  Openness 
Besides an index for trade integration, this ratio also measures the revealed trade policy of government 
                                                
8 See for examples, Anam (1982), Bhagwati (1964), Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), Bhagwati and Srinivason 
(1973), Johnson (1974), Krueger (1974), Sheikh (1974), and Pitt (1981).  
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(Helleiner, 1990). The openness ratio cannot only be affected by trade restrictions but also changes 
when the foreign exchange reserves or exchange rates fluctuate. This measure, therefore, shows the 
actual performance of foreign trade in a country. Trade liberalization, of course, will enhance the 
process  of  integration  into  global  markets  and  one  may  expect  to  consider  lower  incentives  for 
smuggling. However, trade liberalization requires transparency and efficient enforcement of law to 
impede increasing illegal trade under the cover of legal trade. As Pitt (1981) predicted, the greater the 
legal trade, the easier it is to hide smuggling from enforcement agencies and smuggling would be less 
costly. This issue will be more serious when the foreign trade section and customs lack transparency 
and enforcement of the law is weak.  The Iranian experience on the increase of illegal imports through 
free  trade  zones  refers  to  such  institutional  shortages  for  benefiting  from  more  trade  openness 
(Arabmazar, 2007). Following conventional practices in most of the literature on globalization, trade 
integration is calculated as [non-oil exports + imports]/non-oil GDP. The average of openness index 
for the pre-revolution period (1970-79), the Iraq-Iran war period (1980-1988), and the post-war period 
(1989-2004) is 40, 41, and 31 percent, respectively. The data for calculation of this index are from 
central bank of Iran. 
 
5.1.6.   Education 
In combating corruption related activities such as smuggling, not only do we need transparency within 
the government but also publicity. Transparency means accessibility of information, while publicity 
refers to whether the information is actually been accessed by citizens. Understanding the available 
information through more transparency is conditioned by the general level of education in the society.  
Transparency without educated people is like expanding press freedom without giving people the 
required tools for analyzing the raw data in the press.   
In sum, education increases the ability of society to control the government behaviour and to judge 
their performance. Educated society also plays an important role as an external control on corruption 
in the government administration (Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Ades and Di Tella, 1999). Finally, the 
negative  relationship  between  education  and  corruption  is  well  investigated  in  the  literature. 
(Treismann, 2000; Ali and Isse, 2003; Alt and Lassen, 2003; Rauch and Evan, 2000; to name a few). 
The average level of education, measured by literacy rate, for the pre-revolution period (1970-79), the 
Iraq-Iran war period (1980-1988), and the post-war period (1989-2006) is 44, 59.9, and 80.3 percent, 
respectively. The source of this data is the central bank of Iran.   
In order to control for the oil price shock of 1974, the special socio-economy situation during the 
revolution and war with Iraq (1979-1988), revision of the penalty codes on smuggling in 1994, and 
unification of exchange rates and high devaluation of the rial against US dollar in 2002, we have 




5.2.1.  The Real Governmental Revenue 
Smuggling has a significant impact on government revenues. We can assume that total governmental 
revenue is a function of national income (Y). Increasing national income can be a sign of business 
prosperity and higher levels of obtainable taxes. In addition, increasing legal imports lead to higher 
levels of tax on imports revenues. Consequently, we expect that the government’s revenues (GR) also 
increase [(GR= F(national income, legal imports)]. By assuming that total domestic demand (Q) is met 
by legal import and illegal imports, we have [Q = legal imports + illegal imports] and [GR= F(national 
income,  Q  -  illegal  imports)].  According  to  this  assumption,  total  government  revenues  will  be 
reduced  by  an  increasing  flow  of  illegal  trade  mainly  because  of  tariff  evasion  by  smugglers. 
Meanwhile, export smuggling and mis-invoicing have a negative effects on the government revenues. 
They usually export highly subsidized goods such as gasoline or mis-invoicing their real exports to 
benefit from attractive bonuses or black market premium. These subsides financed through oil and tax 
revenues by the government. The average growth rate of government revenues (oil, tax and other 
revenues) for the pre-revolution period (1970-79), the Iraq-Iran war period (1980-1988), and the post-
war period (1989-2006) is 38.44, 5.23, and 36.87 percent, respectively. The source of this data is the 
central bank of Iran.  
 
5.2.2.  Import Price Index 
The  Import  Price  Index  (IPI)  measures  price  changes  of  goods  purchased  from  other  countries. 
Theoretical discussion for IPI-smuggling relationship can be found in Thursby et al. (1991). Their 
model indicates that if the price effect of smuggling is greater than its cost, then it is possible that 
smuggling improves the welfare. Thus combating smuggling might reduce the consumer welfare. In 
addition,  Martin  and  Panagariya  (1993)  examined  the  enforcement  law  against  smuggling  which 
results in increasing per unit cost of smuggling and domestic prices of imports.  
Through the evasion of legal duties and tariffs, smugglers have a cost advantage compared to legal 
importers in the domestic market. Therefore, they are able to earn their expected profit margin with 
lower prices than the market equilibrium price. Depending on the share of smuggled product in the 
domestic market, the market equilibrium price of that product will decline. The average growth rate of 
import price index for the pre-revolution period (1971-79), the Iraq-Iran war period (1980-1988), and 
the post-war period (1989-2005) is 10, 16, and 22 percent, respectively. The data for this index is from 
the central bank of Iran.  
 
5.2.3.  Consumption of Gasoline 
The idea of using this variable as one of the indicators of smuggling roots in heavy subsidy of fuel 
products in Iran. This causes a considerable price disparity among Iran and the other neighbouring 
countries such as Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan. For example, according to the director general of 19 
Iran’s Customs Administration, crude oil and oil products accounted for over 90% of goods smuggled 
from Iran over the years 2000-2005. According to records for the population of different provinces in 
Iran, the per capita consumption of gasoline in border provinces was 10-60% higher than in central 
provinces. In addition, according to the ex-cabinet secretary of Iranian government, each year more 
than five billion litres of fuel - mainly gasoline - is smuggled out of the country. It costs the state about 
1.13 billion USD each year.
9 However, other key factors affect the consumption of gasoline too. These 
factors are real GDP per capita, number of cars per 1000 persons, and the current and the last period of 
real  gasoline  prices.  I  estimate  the  gasoline  consumption  with  instrumental  variable  method.  The 
independent variables explain about 90% of fluctuations of gasoline consumption. The residuals show 
us an unexplained part of gasoline consumption by mentioned factors. I assume then that smuggling 
affects positively this part of unexplained consumption in gasoline.  Appendix A presents details of 
variables, definitions and sources.  
 
6  Estimation and Results 
All causes and indicators except the dummy are in natural logarithm and standardized from the mean. 
Estimation of the structural part of the model provides ordinal estimations of smuggling, which then 
calibrated with the exogenous information obtained from the trade discrepancy method, which enables 
us  to  examine  the  relative  and  then  absolute  amount  of  smuggling  in  trade.  Table  4  presents 
estimations for five specifications. 
 The tariff burden in all specifications that were included has a positive and  significant effect on 
smuggling. Its coefficient is also stable across specifications 1, 2 and 5. The penalty rate on smuggling 
has entered into models in its inverse form. This is done to make the distribution of this variable 
normal. The effect of the inverse of this variable on smuggling is always positive and significant. 
Thus, the relation between the penalty rate itself and smuggling is clearly negative. Except for the 
specifications 3 and 4 where its size was reduced, in the other cases the coefficient of this variable is 
stable.  
The  black  exchange  market  premium  encourages  and  discourages  smuggling  in  different 
specifications. In specifications 1, 2, and 5 where we include the tariff burden, BMP has a negative 
effect  on  smuggling.  This  means  that  by  increasing  the  premium,  the  financing  costs  of  import 
smuggling will increase, too. In other words, the import underinvoicer should pay more for importing 
the unreported parts of his imports. In specifications 3 and 4 when we exclude tariff burden, the 
increasing premium encourages engaging in illegal trade. In this case, the effecting channel of BMP is 
through export smuggling. The export smuggler has more incentive to under invoice his real exports 
and sell the unreported export earnings on the black market of the foreign exchange. In specifications 
1 and 2, we have also controlled for real GDP per capita. The sign is positive but not significant. The 
                                                
9 See: www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/print/131345258.html (access: 3 April 2008) 20 
positive sign of this variable shows that increasing income per capita increases demand for both legal 
and illegal imports within the domestic market and not necessarily increasing the investment in better 
institutions and transparency in Iran.  
The  openness  index,  which  measures  the  magnitude of  legal  trade  controlling  for  the  size  of  the 
economy,  has  a  negative  but  not  significant  effect  on  smuggling  in  specification  2.  However,  in 
specifications  3  and  4,  it  has  a  positive  and  significant  effect  on  smuggling.  This  supports  the 
theoretical debates of Pitt (1981) and Thursby et al. (1991), that legal trade camouflages smuggling. 
Increasing legal trade through more openness reduces the cost of smuggling or mis-invoicing the real 
price or quantity of products. 
 The effect of the general level of education on mitigation of smuggling in specifications 3 and 4 is 
evident and highly significant. This result highlights the importance of investing in human resources 
which  enables  people  to  engage  more  in  the  process  of  decision  making  and  questioning  the 
government  for  more  accountability.  More  education  also  provides  better  opportunities  in  legal 
activities, which in turn deters the workforce from smuggling.  
In the measurement part of the model, scaling the latent variable of smuggling to one of indicators 
with a correct sign is necessary for the identification of such a model. The real import price index in 
all specifications, except specification 4, is selected as a scale variable and fixed to -1.
10 In order to 
check the robustness of estimations, in specification 4, the real government revenue is opted for the 
scale variable and fixed to -1. In sum, the effect of smuggling on real government revenue and real 
import price index (in specification 4) is negative and significant.
11  
The effect of smuggling on the gasoline consumption is positive but not significant. However, when 
we include the growth rate of petroleum products consumption (not reported here), this positive effect 
will be also significant. Finally, taking into account the signs and significancy of estimates as well as 
general fit indices; we selected models 3 and 5 for estimating the ordinal index of smuggling. The 
ordinal index of smuggling, then, is calculated according to both specifications 3 and 5. The index of 
smuggling is estimated on the base of specifications 3 and 5 as follows:
12 
(S.3) dummy    × 0.12 + (edu) ln  × 0.91 - (open) Ln  × 0.15 + (arf) ln  × 0.16 + (BMP) Ln  × 0.15 = Smuggling           (6) 
(S.5)     (Tariff) Ln  × 0.29 + (arf) Ln  × 0.74 + (BMP) Ln  × 0.56 - = Smuggling                                             (7) 
                                                
10 We expect that increasing smuggling reduces the price of imported goods. However, as indicated by Stapleton 
(1978), the choice of the indicator fixing the scale of the latent variable is to some extent arbitrary but does not 
affect the results. 
11 When we use real tax on import revenues instead of real government revenues, the effect of smuggling is still 
negative but not significant (not reported here) and it will reduce the general fitness of models, too. 
 
12 Before estimation of MIMIC models, the variables are tested for stationary. Most of them are not stationary at 
the  levels.  Therefore,  we  have  carried  out  Johanson  cointegration  test,  showing  that  the  variables  are 
cointegrated.  The Unit root and Johanson cointegration results are reported in  Appendix C.  Furthermore, 
analysis of normality and residuals of models 3 and 5 are reported in Appendix D and E, respectively. 
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To calibrate the model and obtain a cardinal series, an exogenous estimation of smuggling in foreign 
trade is required in one of the years of sample. In this due, I have estimated the total mis-invoicing in 
Iran’s export and import with her major trading partners.
13 We estimate misinvoicng of Iranian trade 
through the following equations: 
Factor   CIF × X - X   =   ng Misinvoici Export  i c                                                                          (8) 
Factor   CIF   × M   - M   =   ng Misinvoici Import  i c                                                                           (9)         
where 
 Xi are imports from Iran as reported by her major trading partners; 
Xc are exports as reported by Iran (FOB prices) to her trading partners; 
Mc are imports as recorded by Iran with her trading partners; 
Mi are exports to Iran as recorded by her trading partners. 
CIF is the cost, insurance and freight costs, while FOB refers to free on board without transport costs. 
Imports and exports are in CIF and FOB prices.  In order to make imports and exports comparable, we 
add 10% to exports figures which is suggested by IMF (1993).  The calculation of trade discrepancy 
was carried out for the period of 1988-2006. When the result in the equation 8 is negative, then we 
have  over-invoicing  of  exports  by  Iranians  and  positive  outcomes  refer  to the  under-invoicing  of 
exports. When the result is positive in equation 9, it refers to the over-invoicing of imports by Iranians, 
and in the case of a negative result, we will have  under-invoicing  of  imports. Gulati  (1987)  and 
McDonald  (1985)  have  argued  that  both  reported  exports  and  imports  may  be  biased  because  of 
deliberate mis-invoicing in order to bypass controls, tariff evasion and/or to facilitate capital flights. 
Although the reasons behind these discrepancies are not exclusively due to mis-invoicing, one can 
estimate the illegal practices in foreign trade through such systematic discrepancies. Tables B1-B3 
(Appendix B) show import, export, and total mis-invoicing in Iran. Yavari (2000) also calculated 
import mis-invoicing in Iran for the period of 1988-1997. His calculation is illustrated in table B4 
(Appendix B). The figures in his calculation are approximately close to our calculation of import mis-
invoicing  for  the  same  period.  The  differences  may  be  due  to  different  trade  weights  and  trade 
partners, which are used in his analysis.  
I use the figure in the year 1993 as a share of total mis-invoicing in the total trade of Iran. This leads to 
the relative size of mis-invoicing in the foreign trade of Iran equal to 12.74%. We use this figure for 
calibration of the ordinal index of smuggling derived from structural equations (equations 6 and 7). 
The relative size of smuggling in total trade in the specifications 3 and 5 is illustrated in figure 3. We 
can observe a declining trend of relative size of smuggling in both specifications. Generally, the higher 
                                                
13 The IMF authorities provided the author with this information regarding the major trading partners of Iran, 
estimating the real effective exchange rate of Iran on the base of these trade weights. 22 
amount of smuggling is calculated from 1970 to 1988. The main reason behind this relative higher 
smuggling  can  be  seen  in  higher  real  tariff  burden,  negligible  real  penalty  for  smuggling,  higher 
premium  in  black  market,  and  lower  education  level.  Since  1988  and  by  initiation  of  economic 
construction  development  plans  and  gradual  elimination  of  non-tariff  barriers,  revision  of  penalty 
rates, higher general education and relative reduction in black market premium, we observe a lower 
amount of smuggling in Iran.  
The estimated relative size of smuggling enables us to calculate the absolute amount of illegal trade in 
Iran. Table B5 (Appendix B) presents the estimated amount of smuggling over 1988-2002 on the base 
of specifications 3 and 5. The average of the absolute amount of smuggling in specifications 3 and 5 is 
2820 and 2474 million USD, respectively. Specification 3 shows a steady decrease in the share of 
smuggling in the Iranian trade from 16% in 1970 to just above 11% in 2002. The average size of 
smuggling in trade over this period is about 14%. According to specification 5, the relative size of 
smuggling for the period of 1970-1984 is nearly stable around 13%, reducing to about 11% at the end 
of period. The average size of smuggling in trade for this specification is about 12%.  
Tables B6 and B7 (Appendix B) show that the causal variables with most effect on the smuggling are 
education in specification 3 and penalty rate in specification 5. An increase in standard deviation of 
literacy rate reduces smuggling by 0.94 standard deviations, while the increasing penalty rate by one 
standard deviation reduces smuggling by 0.58 standard deviation. We calculate the five-years average 
of  causal  variables of  specifications 3  and  5  as well as the  smuggling share  in trade  in order to 
understand  the  reasons  behind  the  dynamic  of  the  smuggling  size  in  Iran.  The  five-year  growth 
averages are presented in table B8 (Appendix B).  
In specification 3, the share of smuggling in trade (five years average growth) is negative over the total 
period except the last two years of 2001 and 2002.  The major fall in the relative size of smuggling 
happened during 1991-1995. The reason behind this significant reduction is an increase in the real 
penalty rate on smuggling. In the year 1994, the Expediency Council of Iran revised the punishment 
codes against smuggling and increased the fine rate substantially.  In the last two years of 2001 and 
2002, we observe that the relative size of smuggling increases by 0.20%. This is mainly caused by a 
decrease in the real penalty rate growth and increasing openness in trade, which stimulate the import 
of illegal products.  This is in line with the predictions of the Pitt (1981) model.  
In specification 5, we have used the fine rate, BMP and tariff burden for the construction of the index. 
The difference with pervious specification can be seen in the average figure of positive growth of 
smuggling in trade over the period 1970-1980. For the remaining time horizon, the qualitative trend is 
similar to the pervious specification. Over the period of 1971-1975, the relative size of smuggling 
increased by 0.30%. Although during this period, the tariff burden decreased on average by 14% but at 
the same time the real fine rate reduced by 24%. Over the period of 1976-1980, the increase in the 
relative size of smuggling in trade is more than its last five years’ average, accounting for 0.41%. The 23 
main driver of this increase was the growth in the tariff burden by about 13% and of course, the 
negative growth of the real fine rate stimulated the rise of smuggling.  Similar to specification 3, the 
largest decrease in the relative size of smuggling happens during the period 1991-1995, on average. 
The major reason behind this decrease was a significant increase in the real fine rate on smuggling as 
well as an increasing black market premium by 99%. The latter increased the financing costs of illegal 
imports and in this specification; it has a negative effect on the relative size of smuggling.  However, 
the reduction trend in smuggling stopped at the end of 2000. We can consider the increasing size of 
smuggling on average by  6% over the last two years of 2001 and 2002. The main driver of this 
development is a reduction in the real penalty rate on smuggling and a reduction in financing the costs 
of illegal imports, e.g. fall of BMP following the unification of exchange rates in 2002. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The size and absolute amount of smuggling in the total trade of Iran has been estimated by applying 
MIMIC modelling and the trade discrepancy method over the period of 1970-2002. On the base of two 
different  specifications,  the  annual  absolute  amount  of  smuggling  for  the  period  1988-2002 
approaches $3 billion on average. Furthermore, the relative size of smuggling in trade on average over 
the period 1970-2002 is 13%. The main points from standardized effects of causal on smuggling and 
smuggling on indicators are as follows: 
•  Real  penalty  rates  (the  Iranian  rial  per  every  US  dollar  smuggled  goods)  have  the  most 
significant effect on smuggling. 1 standard deviation (SD) increase in fine rate leads to a 
decrease in smuggling by 0.58 SD.  
•  1 SD increase in the literacy rate reduces smuggling by (0.94). 1 SD increase in BMP and 
legal trade (as a share in GDP) increase smuggling by 0.15 for each of them.  
•  The major effect of smuggling is for the reduction of the import price index. 1 SD increase in 
smuggling reduces this index by (1.25) and (0.97). The negative effect on real government 
revenue is smaller than the reduction in import price index. 
It is worthy to note that our macro model of smuggling identifies the main elements that have 
potential effects on the latent variable of smuggling and the major consequences of increasing 
smuggling in the economy. We tried to control for major institutional effects as well as exogenous 
shocks like oil prices, war, revolution and unification of exchange rates over the period of study.  
However, the future studies should also consider the role of para-statal and military organizations 
in illegal trade.  
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 Table 4:  Estimations of MIMIC-model 
 
Specification  1  2  3  4  5 
Causes           
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Ln (Import Price 
Index) 
-1.00  -1.00  -1.00   -1.76*** 
(-3.80) 
-1.00 


























Goodness of Fit Indices         
RMSEA
a  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
p-value
b  0.94  0.94  0.96  0.96  0.98 
GFI
c  0.88  0.86  0.89  0.89  0.93 
AGFI
d  0.83  0.81  0.84  0.85  0.89 
NFI
e  0.70  0.67  0.85  0.85  0.82 
           
Note. (a): The RMSEA shows how well the model, with unknown but optimally chosen parameter values, would 
fit the population covariance matrix if it were available. Values less than 0.05 are indicators of a good fit. 
(b): P-value also tests the hypothesis H0: RMSEA<0.05. 
(c): This index ranges between 0 and 1. The GFI>0.90 is usually taken as reflecting acceptable fits. 
(d): GFI adjusted for a degree of freedom. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Data explanation   
 
Variables  Definition  Transformation  Source 
Fine rate 
Penalty amount in rial for each 
USD value of smuggled goods, 
adjusted for inflation 
-The inverse form of 
fine rate is used 
-logarithmic form 
-standardized from mean 
 
 
Madah and Pajoyan  
(2005) 
BMP  The difference between official  -percentage  Central Bank of Iran 29 
and black exchange rate for 
USD/rial 
-logarithmic form 




The ratio of real tax on 
imports/ real imports 
-logarithmic form 
-standardized from mean 
Central Bank of Iran 
online database 
RGDPPC  Real GDP per capita 
-logarithmic form 
-standardized from mean 






-standardized from mean 
Central Bank of Iran 
online database 
Education  Literacy  rate 
-logarithmic form 
-standardized from mean 
Central Bank of Iran 
online database 
Import price index  Real Import price index 
-logarithmic form 
-standardized from mean 
Central Bank of Iran 
online database 
RG  Real government revenues 
-logarithmic form 
-standardized from mean 
Central Bank of Iran 
online database 
Gas_cons  Gasoline consumption 
Residual from 
regression of gasoline 
consumption on real 
current and past gasoline 
prices, real GDP per 
capita, number of cars 
per 1000 persons 
-logarithmic form 
-standardized from mean 
Various reports of 
Ministry of petroleum 
of Iran 
 
Appendix B: Estimating smuggling by trade discrepancy methodology  
 
Mis-invoicing of import and export between Iran and her major 19 trading partners (e.g. Australia, 
Austria, Brazil, Canada, China, P.R.: Mainland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Switzerland ,Turkey, UAE , and UK). The amount of trade 
with these countries is used by the IMF to calculate the real effective Exchange Rate of Iran for recent 
years. The main differences between import and export figures usually arise because most exports are 
recorded on an F.O.B. basis and most imports on C.I.F. The difference represents the cost of transport 
and insurance. Therefore we have to adjust the export figures by adding 10% to the original value of 
exports. The 10% factor is an approximate value of the costs of the insurance and freight (IMF, 1993). 




Table B 1: Import Mis-invoicing (Million USD) 
Year  Under-invoicing of imports  Over-invoicing of imports 
1988  849.223   
1989    1353.0626 
1990    1302.2909 
1991    4526.6547 
1992    4184.4239 
1993    2922.7846 
1994  183.4126   
1995    73.1655 
1996    647.7069 
1997  380.2756   
1998    474.3407 
1999    377.1785 
2000    53.1018 
2001    168.1432 
2002    2148.758 
2003    2.88 
2004  48.2196   
2005  0.0212   
2006  0.0059   
Source: Raw trade figures of Iran with major trading partners from DOT (IMF) and calculation of mis-
invoicing from author. 
 
 
Table B 2: Export Mis-invoicing (Million USD) 
Year  Under-invoicing of exports  Over-invoicing of exports 
1988    1563.162 
1989    2256.979 
1990    3421.792 
1991    196.216 
1992    753.651 
1993  169.788   
1994    2482.787 
1995    1043.547 
1996    2577.244 
1997    1507.081 
1998    1531.743 
1999    3343.953 
2000    0.0118 
2001    0.0029 
2002    0.002 
2003    7.9798 
2004  134.9124   
2005    0.0264 
2006    0.0369 
Source: Raw trade figures of Iran with major trading partners from DOT (IMF) and calculation of mis-





Table B3: Total Mis-invoicing (Million USD) 
Year  Total mis-invoicing 
1988  -2412.39 
1989  -903.916 
1990  -2119.5 
1991  4330.439 
1992  3430.773 
1993  3092.573 
1994  -2666.2 
1995  -970.382 
1996  -1929.54 
1997  -1887.36 
1998  -1057.4 
1999  -2966.77 
2000  53.09 
2001  168.1403 
2002  2148.756 
2003  -5.0998 
2004  86.6928 
2005  -0.0476 
2006  -0.0428 
Source: Raw trade figures of Iran with major trading partners from DOT (IMF) and calculation of mis-
invoicing from author. 
 
 
Table B4: Mis-invoicing of Imports (1988-1997) 
Year  Under-invoicing of imports  Over-invoicing of imports 
1988  1306.8   
1989    329.6 
1990    453.8 
1991    3212.8 
1992    231.5 
1993    2460.9 
1994    181 
1995    454.8 
1996    809.3 
1997  876.3   
Source: Yavari (2000) 
 
 
Table B5: Absolute Amount of Smuggling (Million USD) 
Year  Smuggling S.3  Smuggling S.5 
1988  1706.012  1382.017 
1989  2430.946  1997.837 
1990  3723.415  3001.683 
1991  4249.629  3619.34 
1992  4261.335  3699.233 
1993  3092.573  3092.573 
1994  2267.222  1863.521 
1995  2158.584  1844.75 
1996  2630.886  2398.433 
1997  2432.637  2323.788 32 
1998  2039.769  1818.11 
1999  2480.813  2154.558 
2000  2519.207  2211.849 
2001  2791.209  2492.933 
2002  3256.807  3218.418 
Average  2802.736  2474.603 
Source: Own calculation 
 
 
Table B6: Total effects of model 3 
Standardized total effects of X on ETA 
  LnBMP  LnARF  LnOPEN  LnEDU  Dummy 
Smuggling  0.15  0.16  0.15  -0.94  0.06 
Standardized total effects of ETA on Y 
  Smuggling 
LnIM  -0.97 
LnRG  -0.55 
LnGAS_CO  0.15 
 
 
Table B7: Total effects of model 5 
Standardized total effects of X on ETA 
  LnBMP  LnARF  LnTARIFF  Dummy 
Smuggling  -0.45  0.58  0.23  0.02 
Standardized total effects of ETA on Y 
  Smuggling 
LnIM  -1.25 
LmRG  -0.44 
LnGAS_CO  0.05 
 
Table B8: Five-year average of annual growth rates 





























































































































Source: Own calculation 
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Appendix C: Unit-Root and Cointegration Tests  
 
Following the guidelines of Breusch (2005) which asserts that with integrated or tending data, the 
levels of variables are strongly informative. If there is cointegration, the strategy of estimating the 
differences dismisses such information.  
 
Table C1: Unit Root Tests 
Level  1
st Diff.    Included in 
equation  ADF  PP  ADF  PP 
Causals 
Ln (ARF)                C & T  -2.03  -1.95  -6.09*  -6.68* 
Ln (BMP)                C & T  -1.29  -1.32  -5.12*  -5.05* 
Ln(Tariff)                C & T  -2.73  -2.80  -6.09*  -6.85* 
Ln (RGDPPC)         None  -3.42*  -3.39*  -  - 
Ln (Open)               C & T  -3.38***  -3.38***  -  - 
Ln (Edu)                  C & T  -1.55  -1.32  -3.55***  -3.53*** 
Indicators 
Ln(Im)  C  -0.15  0.80  -2.71***  -2.66*** 
Ln(Rg)  C & T  -1.83  -2.05  -4.52*  -4.52* 
Ln(Gas_con)  None  -6.33*  -6.57*  0.00*  0.00* 
 
 
Table C2: Johansen Cointegration Test 
Variables (n)                                                                          Number of Cointegrated Vectors 
Ln(im), ln(arf), ln(bmp), ln(edu)                                          3 (Trace) and 2 (Max-Eigenvalue) 
Ln (rg), ln(arf), ln(bmp),ln(edu)                                           2 (Trace) and 1( Max- Eigenvalue) 
 
Appendix D:  Analysis of Normality 
 
The following table 5 presents the tests of normality (univariate) of the variables used in MIMIC 
models. This test has performed by Eviews 5 software and presents the p-value of the Jarque-Bera 
Test. The p-values larger than 5% confirm the acceptance of null hypothesis, indicating normal 
distribution of respected variables.  
 
Table D1: J-Bera Test (P-value) of Univariate Normality 
Causes  J-Bera test (p-value) 
Ln (ARF)  0.17 
Ln (BMP)  0.28 
Ln (Edu)  0.30 
Ln (Open)  0.30 
Ln (Rgdppc)  0.57 
Ln (Tariff)  0.71 
Indicators 
Ln (Im)  0.19 
Ln(Rg)  0.51 
Ln (Gas_cons)  0.00   
 
Appendix E: Analysis of Residuals 
 
The analysis of residuals which is presented in table 8 and figure 5 allows the validity of the model to 
be accepted. Nomal probability or the Q plot which is demonstrated in figure 5 plots the standardized 34 
residuals (horizontal axis) against the quantiles of the normal distribution. The best possible fit would 
be indicated if all residuals were lying in a straight vertical line, whereas the worst possible fit would 
be indicated if all residuals were lying in a horizontal line. An acceptable fit is indicated when the 
residuals  lie  approximately  along  the  diagonal,  with  steeper  plots  showing  the  better  fits 
(Diamantopoulos et al. 2000). Table 8 and figure 5 allow the validity of model 3 to be accepted. The 
residuals obtained are small and lower than 2. Also, the residuals are clustered symmetrically around 
the zero point, with most residuals lying in the middle of distribution and fewer in the tails, following 
an almost symmetrical positive-negative pattern. The same discussion is true for the model 5 residuals 
which are presented in table 9 and figure 6.  
 
Table E1: Analysis of Residuals of the Model 3 
Summary Statistics for Standardized Residuals 
Smallest Standardized Residual =   -1.673703 
Median Standardized Residual =    0.000000 














Figure 5: Q-plot diagram of standardized residuals (model 3)        35 
Table E2: Analysis of Residuals of the Model 5 
Summary Statistics for Standardized Residuals 
Smallest Standardized Residual = -1.867640 
Median Standardized Residual =  0.000000 















Figure 6: Q-plot diagram of standardized residuals (model 5) CESifo Working Paper Series 
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